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FAMILY LAW - ADOPTION: DO LAWS PROHIBITING
REIMBURSEMENT TO A NATURAL MOTHER FOR
REASONABLE
EXPENSES
INCURRED
DURING
PREGNANCY TRULY SERVE THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD? In re Adoption No. 9979, 323 Md. 39, 591 A.2d
468 (1991).
According to a recent Time Magazine article on infertility, more
than one couple in twelve in this country have difficulty conceiving·
a child" Once a couple reaches the "thirtysomething years," that
number increases to one out of every seven couples. 2 In fact, "[t]he
number of doctor visits for fertility problems nearly tripled between
1968 and 1984."3 For this and a variety of other reasons more and
more couples are turning to adoption as an alternative.
In 1975, the Federal Government stopped recording the number
of babies adopted each year. 4 An independent estimate in 1986, from
the National Committee for Adoption in Washington, set the total
for that year at approximately 60,000 adoptions by non-relatives. 5
From the early 1980s it seems that independent adoptions6 are also
on the rise. 7 As the number of private adoptions escalates, many
professionals are concerned that the standards and safeguards, intended first and foremost to protect the children, are slipping. 8
In re Adoption No. 99799 and this casenote address one of the
many adoption issues our courts face today: Which expenses incurred
by a natural mother during her pregnancy are reimbursable by
adoptive parents?1O This is an important question because Maryland
law prohibits the payment of compensation to a natural parent in
exchange for that parent's consent to an adoption. II Reimbursement
L Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Making Babies, TIME, Sept. 30, 1991, at 56, 56.
2.Id.
3. Id. at 58.
4. Nancy Gibbs, The Baby Chase, TIME, Oct. 9, 1989, at 86, 86.
5.Id.
6. Eileen Ogintz, "Baby Wanted: Call Viv ... ": How More Couples are Advertising for a Child, GLAMOUR, Aug. 1988, at 160, 162 ("Most states recognize
three legal paths to adoption: through public agencies, usually part of local or
state government; through private agencies; and through private placement
(independent) arrangements."). See generally infra note 14.
7. Ogintz, supra note 6, at 162. In 1982. according to the National Committee
for Adoption, there were 16,743 independent adoptions and 14,549 private
agency adoptions. This was the first time since 1961 that independent adoptions
outpaced private agency adoptions. Id.
8. See Gibbs, supra note 4, at 88.
9. 323 Md. 39, 591 A.2d 468 (1991).
10. See id. at 40, 591 A.2d at 469.
ll. See infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
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for certain expenses could, therefore, result in crimina1 prosecution
and conviction of a misdemeanor .12 The expense in question in In re
Adoption No. 9979 was a reimbursement for maternity clothing. 13
In re Adoption No. 9979 concerned a petition for the adoption
of an infant child filed in Circuit Court for Montgomery County,
Maryland. 14 A court investigator conducted an adoption investigation
and recommended that the petition be granted. IS The investigator
also requested, however, that the adoptive parents submit itemized
bills of all payments made to or on behalf of the natural mother .16
The adoptive parents filed a statement of expenses paid to the natural
mother which included a $488.00 reimbursement for maternity clothing'"
At the close of the adoption hearing on October 25, 1989, the
trial judge signed the final decree approving the adoption. IS Subse-

12. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-327 (1991). Section 5-327 of the Family
Law Code provides the following:
(a) In general. - (1) An agency, institution, or individual who
renders any service in connection with the placement of an individual
for adoption may not charge or receive from or on behalf of either
the natural parent of the individual to be adopted, or from or on
behalf of the individual who is adopting the individual, any compensation for the placement.
(2) This subsection does not prohibit the payment, by any interested person, of reasonable and customary charges or fees for hospital
or medical or legal services.

13.

14.

15.
16.
17.

18.

(c) Prosecution by State's Attorney. - The State's Attorney shall
prosecute any violation of this section.
(d) Penalty. - A person who violates this section is guilty of a .
misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to a fine not exceeding
$100 or imprisonment not exceeding 3 months, or both, for each
offense.
Id. See generally infra note 47.
See No. 9979, 323 Md. at 40, 591 A.2d at 469. As requested by the court
investigator, the natural mother provided the trial court with an itemized list
of the clothing purchased. Id. For the itemized list of the maternity clothing,
see id. at 41 n.l, 591 A.2d at 469 n.l.
Id. at 40, 591 A.2d at 469. This was a direct adoption, not involving any
agency, but handled and consented to privately by the natural and adoptive
parents. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 40-41, 591 A.2d at 469. Among the other expenses were attorney's fees,
court costs and $378.35 paid to the natural mother as reimbursement for
hospitalization insurance. The compensation for these expenses went unchallenged by the State .. Appellants' attorney submitted an affidavit from the
natural mother that she had not kept any of the bills for the maternity clothing;
she did, however, itemize the expenses for the court. Id.
Id. at 54, 591 A.2d at 476 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
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quently, on December 14, 1989, the judge entered an order finding
that the reimbursement for the maternity clothing was not a permitted
expense and was therefore disallowed. 19 The adopting parents appealed the trial judge's order to the court of special appeals and,
prior to consideration of the case by the lower appellate court, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland issued a writ of certiorari. 20 The
primary issue for consideration by the court of appeals was whether
section 5-327 of the Maryland Family Law Code prohibits adoptive
parents from reimbursing a natural mother for maternity clothing
expenses. 21
Adopting a child is a relatively new legal concept in America. 22
The first state adoption statute was enacted in Massachusetts in
185}.23 The first Maryland adoption statute was contained in chapter
244 of the Acts of 1892.24 In Maryland, "[a]doption did not exist at
common law but is governed by statutes [currently] codified in
sections 5-301 through 5-330 of the Family Law Article. "25 The term
"adoption" itself was only recently defined by the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland as "the means by which the legal relationship
of parent and child is created between those not related as such by
nature. "26
In 1947, the Maryland General Assembly, acting upon the recommendations of a commission appomted in 1945 to study Maryland
adoption laws,27 revised then existing law with the enactment of
chapter 599, Laws of 1947.28 One of the most noteworthy changes
19.
20.
21.
22.

23.
24.

25.
26.

27.
28.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Susan

55, 591 A.2d at 476 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
41-42, 591 A.2d at 469.
42, 591 A.2d at 469.
K. LeMay, Note, The Emergence oj Wrongful Adoption As A Cause
oj Action, 27 J. FAM. L. 475, 475 (1988-89) ("The status of a parent-child
relationship created by adoption is a relatively new concept in American law;
the first adoption statute was not enacted until 1851.").
Id. at 475 n.l; Yasuhide Kawashima, Adoption in Early America, 20 J. FAM.
L. 677, 677 (1981-82).
L.F.M. v. Department of Social Servs., 67 Md. App. 379, 391, 507 A.2d 1151,
1157 (1986). Chapter 244 of the Acts of 1892 is currently codified at MD.
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-301 to -330 (1991). In re Lynn M., 312 Md. 461,
463, 540 A.2d 799, 800 (1988).
Stambaugh v. Child Support Enforcement Admin., 323 Md. 106, 110, 591
A.2d 501, 503 (1991) (citations omitted); see MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§
5-301 to -330 (1991).
L.F.M., 67 Md. App. at 391, 507 A.2d at 1157.
Id.; see John S. Strahorn, Jr., Changes Made by the New Adoption Law, 10
MD. L. REv. 20, 21 (1949).
L.F.M., 67 Md. App. at 391-92, 507 A.2d at 1157. The statute enacted as
chapter 599 of the Laws of 1947 was virtually identical to the one proposed
by the commission. Id. (citing Report oj the Commission to Study Revision
oj Adoption Laws oj the State oj Maryland, BALTIMORE DAILY REc., June 1,
1946).
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in this new law was the inclusion of a legislative policy acknowledging
the need for protection of the parties to an adoption (Le., the child,
the natural parents, and the adopting parents).29 With certain minor
changes, this statement of legislative intent remains intact today.30
The courts in Maryland have focused upon the preservation of
the welfare and interests of the adopted child as the most important
of the purposes espoused in section 5-303(b)(1).31 The Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland held in Courtney v. RichmomP2 that "[t]he
law governing adoptions seeks to protect the child, the natural parents
and the adopting parent or parents[.] [T]he rights of the parents,
both natural and adoptive, are not absolute, however, but are subject
to the best interests of the child. "33 The court further asserted that,
although the rights of the natural and adoptive parents should be
carefully guarded, the best interests of the child are the primary
considerations in every adoption. 34
An adoption proceeding is therefore concerned with the limited
matter of the status of the child to be adopted. 35 Once the trial court
decides that it is in the best interests of the child to approve the
adoption petition, and the adoption decree is signed, the responsibility
and jurisdiction of the court ends. 36 Spencer v. Franks37 supports this

29. See L.F.M., 67 Md. App. at 392, 507 A.2d at 1157. Chapter 599 of the Laws
of 1947 began with the following statement of legislative policy:
The General Assembly declares its conviction that the policies
and procedures for adoption are socially necessary and desirable,
, having as their purpose the three-fold protection of (I) the adoptive
child, from unnecessary separation from his natural parents and from
adoption by persons unfit to have such responsibility; (2) the natural
parents, from hurried and abrupt decisions to give up the child; and
(3) the adopting parents, by providing them information about the
child and his background, and protecting them from subsequent
disturbance of their relationships with the child by natural parents.
[d. (quoting Laws of 1947, ch. 599).
30. [d.; see MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-303(b)(1)-(3) (1991).
31. Lynn M., 312 Md. at 463, 540 A.2d at 800 ("The predominant theme of all
these enactments has been to preserve and protect the interests and welfare of
the child."); see MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-303(b)(I) (1991). Section 5303(b)(I) states that the purpose of the statute is to protect "children from:
(i) unnecessary separation from their natural parents; and (ii) adoption by
individuals who are unfit for the responsibility . . . ." [d.
32. 55 Md. App. 382, 462 A.2d 1223 (1983).
33. [d. at 392, 462 A.2d at 1229 (citation omitted); see also supra note 31.
34. Courtney, 55 Md. App. at 392, 462 A.2d at 1229 (quoting Coffey v. Department
of Social Servs., 41 Md. App. 340, 358, 397 A.2d 233, 243 (1973) (quoting
Winter v. Director of the Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 217 Md. 391, 395-96, 143
A.2d 81, 84, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 912 (1958))).
35. No. 9979, 323 Md. at 58, 591 A.2d at 477 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
36. [d. at 59, 591 A.2d at 478 (Eldridge, J., concurring); Falck v. Chadwick, 190
Md. 461, 467, 59 A.2d 187, 189 (1948) ("The Court is not invested with
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position. In Spencer, the trial court made provisions for custody and
visitafion rights after granting a petition for adoption. 38 The court
of appeals reversed the visitation and custody orders because they
were not within the trial court's jurisdiction once the adoption
petition was decided. 39
One of the primary problems dealt with during such an adoption
proceeding and affecting the interests of children is that of compensation paid by the adoptive parents to the natural parent(s). Certain
Maryland statutes govern the forms of appropriate and inappropriate
compensation related to an adoption. 4O The Court of Appeals of
Maryland, in Stambaugh v. Child Support Enforcement Administration,41 considered these statutes: Article 27, section 35C, of Maryland's Annotated Code and section 5-327 of the Maryland Family
Law Code. 42 The Stambaugh court held that there exists a "strong
policy in [Maryland] forbidding payments of compensation to a
natural parent in exchange for that parent's consent to an adoption. "43
Article 27, section 35C, of Maryland's Annotated Code provides
that "[aJ person may not sell, barter, or trade, or offer to sell,
barter, or trade a child for money or property . . . or anything else
of value."44 Additionally, section 5-327 of the Maryland Family Law
Code, entitled "Prohibited Compensation,"4s makes the payment of
compensation, for or in connection with the placement of an individual for adoption, a criminal misdemeanor punishable by a fine
not to exceed $100 or imprisonment of up to three months, or both. 46
Section 5-327(a)(I) provides as follows:
An agency, institution, or individual who renders any service
in connection with the placement of an -individual for adop-

37.
38.
39.
40.

41.

42.
43.

44.
45.
46.

continuous authority . . . to entertain petitions filed from time to time ...
for modification of the decree on proof of altered circumstances of either the
natural or adoptive parents.").
173 Md. 73, 195 A. 306 (1937).
[d. at 77-79, 195 A. at 308-09.
[d. at 82-83, 195 A. at 310.
See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-327 (1991) (prohibiting certain compensation in adoption proceedings); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35C (1987 & Supp.
1990) (prohibiting "child selling").
323 Md. 106, 591 A.2d 501 (1991). The Stambaugh court sought to determine
whether a natural mother could waive liability on the part of a natural father,
for past or future child support, pursuant to a divorce decree, in exchange for
the father's consent to adoption of the children by the mother's second husband.
[d. at 108, 591 A.2d at 502.
.
[d. at 112, 591 A.2d at 504.
[d.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35C (1987 & Supp. 1990).
See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-327 (1991).
[d. § 5-327(a)(I), (d).
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tion may not charge or receive from or on behalf of either
the natural parent of the individual to be adopted, or from
or on behalf of the individual who is adopting the individual,
any compensation for the placement. 47
Section 5-327(a)(2) provides a narrowly limited exception to the
general rule: "This subsection does not prohibit the payment, by any
interested person, of reasonable and customary charges or fees for
hospital or medical or legal services."48 The medical expenses exception is permitted because it is deemed to directly benefit the child's
best interests, consistent with the underlying policy of Maryland's
adoption laws. 49 Section 5-327 was the governing law for In re
Adoption No. 9979.
Two primary issues faced the court in construing this section
and its application to the facts of the case. The first was whether
the language "individual who renders any service in connection with
the placement of an individual for adoption" governs the natural
mother as a person rendering a service to the adoptive parents. 50 The
second was whether a reimbursement for maternity clothing expenses
falls within the section's exception for medical expenses. 51
Commentators suggest that section 5-327 is not intended to
govern payments made directly to the natural mother by the adoptive
parents but only to third party intermediaries. 52 The language of
section 5-327 supports this argument. Section 5-327 governs payments
made on behalf of the natural parent of the individual to be adopted
to agencies, institutions or individuals who render services in connection with the placement. 53 The section says nothing about payments made directly to the natural parent. If literally construed,
however, the natural parent could be considered an "individual who
47. [d. § 5-327(a)(I). Section 5-327 of the Family Law Article has been amended
to include a provision requiring accounting reports in independent adoptions.
See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-327(c) (Supp. 1992). For purposes of this
Note, the amendment has no consequence, and reference to section 5-327 is to
the version in force at the time No. 9979 was decided.
48. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-327(a)(2) (1991).
49. No. 9979, 323 Md. at 49, 591 A.2d at 473. The court of appeals recognized
that "a lack of clothing could have an adverse effect upon the health and
welfare of the natural mother," and upon the unborn child as well, but noted
that "the same could be said for the lack of food or shelter, and reimbursement
for those expenses would not constitute payment of customary medical expenses." [d.
50. See id. at 42-45, 591 A.2d at 469-71.
51. See id. at 42-43, 49-50, 591 A.2d at 470, 473.
52. [d. at 61-62, 591 A.2d at 479 (Eldridge, J., concurring); see Carol L. Nicolette
& Libby C. Reamer, Comment, Regulatory Options for Surrogate Arrangements
in Maryland, 18 U. HALT. L. REV. llO, 120 (1988).
53. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-327(a)(I) (1991).
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renders any service in connection with the placement of an individual
for adoption .... "54
The Maryland Senate addressed this very issue in 1989, when
Senate Bill 58 was introduced. 55 The original purpose of Senate Bill
58 was to broaden section 5-327's language to include within its
prohibition payments made to natural parents. 56 Senate Bill 58 ultimately was not enacted as a revision of section 5-327, but as an
entirely separate law, Article 27, section 35CY
Like Maryland, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions in
this country also prohibits the payment of monetary or other compensation to a child's natural parents in an effort to attain their
consent to an adoption, or the termination of their parental rights. 58
In fact, almost all jurisdictions have enacted statutes prohibiting
certain forms of compensation for the natural parents' consent to
an adoption with expressly limited exceptions for certain medical and
legal expenses. 59
One such example is illustrated by the decision of the Court of
Appeals of Texas in the case of Kingsley v. State. 60 , The facts of
Kingsley are substantially similar to In re Adoption No. 9979. The
defendant in Kingsley was an attorney who had reimbursed a natural
mother for a variety of expenses she incurred during pregnancy,
including maternity clothing. 61 Kingsley concerned -the application of
the Texas Penal Code Annotated, section 25.06, prohibiting the
payment of compensation to acquire or maintain the possession of

54. See id.
55. See S.B. No. 58, 1989 Md. Leg. Sess.
56. No. 9979, 323 Md. at 62, 591 A.2d at 479-80 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 62-63, 591 A.2d at 480 (Eldridge, J., concurring); see MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 35C (Supp. 1992).
58. See In re Adoption of Kindgren, 540 N.E.2d 485 (III. App. Ct. 1989) (consent
for adoption given for illegal payment of money is void as against public
policy); People v. Daniel, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3 (Cal. App. 1987) (father's conviction
for attempting to sell his daughter to family for $90,000 upheld under criminal
statute prohibiting sale or attempted sale of a person); State v. Roberts, 471
So. 2d 900 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (payment of $3,000 in exchange for consent
to adoption of a baby is illegal); People v. Michelman, 403 N.Y.S.2d 417
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (New York Social Welfare Law § 371(12) deemed to
prohibit "arrangements" made for unauthorized placement of child, and
particularly the business that arises from such placement).
59. See Nicolette & Reamer, supra note 52, at 119-20. As of 1981 at least 41 states
had enacted legislation prohibiting the payment of compensation beyond expenses connected with the adoption itself. Id. at 119 n.71; see Claire Berman,
Laws on Private Adoptions, PARENTS MAGAZINE, Feb. 1983, at 67, 71 ("For
example, in California no payment may be made in connection with an adoption
beyond the medical and living expenses of the mother through the pregnancy.").
60. 744 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
61. Id. at 192.
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a child for the purpose of adoption. 62 The Texas statute provides
exceptions, similar to Maryland's section 5-327, including reimbursement for medical expenses. 63 The court held that payments for
maternity clothes are not legal or medical expenses. 64 Although Kingsley appears to be the only case, outside of Maryland, that specifically
deals with the question of maternity clothing expenses, other jurisdictions have adjudicated the validity of similar expenses. 65
In a five-to-two decision, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
held that reimbursement for maternity clothing expenses incurred by
the natural mother is prohibited by s,ection 5-327.66 The court also
held that the due process rights of the natural mother were violated
by the entry of this order without notice to her or an opportunity

62. Id. at 192-93.
63. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.06 (Vernon 1986). Section 25.06 provides as

follows:
Sale or Purchase of Child
(a) A person commit~ an offense if he:
(1) possesses a child or has the custody, conservatorship, or
guardianship of a child whether or not he has actual possession of
the child, and he offers to accept, agrees to accept, or accepts a thing
of value for the delivery of the child to another or for the possession
of the child by another for the purposes of adoption; or
(2) offers to give, agrees to give, or gives a thing of value to
another for acquiring or maintaining the possession of a child for the
purpose of adoption.
(b) It is an exception to the application of this section that the
thing of value is:
(3) a reimbursement of legal or medical expenses incurred by a
person for the benefit of the child.
Id.
64. Kingsley, 744 S.W.2d at 193.
65. See Brod v. Matter of an Adoption, 522 So. 2d 973 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)

(intermediary for adoptive parent may pay documented living expenses of
natural mother); In re Carballo by Tersigni, 521 N.Y.S.2d 375 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
1987) (attorney acting as intermediary, to seek an adoptive family for child, is
not entitled to fees or reimbursements); In re Adoption of Baby Boy M.G.,
522 N.Y.S.2d 822 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (fee paid to adoption agency, licensed
in Arizona but not in New York, is improper); In re Adoption of Alyssa,
L.B., 501 N.Y.S.2d 595 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (adoptive parents not required
to reimburse maternal grandmother for money given to natural mother to
purchase an automobile); In re Baby Girl D., 517 A.2d 925 (Pa. 1986) (only
medical payments that directly benefit child are reimbursable; counseling of
natural mother, housing expenses, medical expenses unrelated to birth, not
reimbursable); Gorden v. Cutler, 471 A.2d 449 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (lying-in
expenses deemed to directly benefit child are properly reimbursable).
66. No. 9979, 323 Md. at 40, 591 A.2d at 469.
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to contest it. 67 As a result, the trial court's order compelling the
natural mother to repay the $488.00 was vacated. 68 The concurrence,
written by Judge Eldridge and joined by Judge Rodowsky, agreed
that the natural mother's due process rights were violated by an
order to repay the money but disagreed with the majority's reasoning
as to the scope of section 5-327's coverage. 69
The majority opinion begins with a summary of the appellants'
arguments and then proceeds to answer each in turn. 70 The court
rejected appellants' first argument, that section 5-327 does not apply
to payments made directly to the natural parent(s) but only to
doctors, lawyers and other third-party intermediaries. 71 The court
held that a natural parent is included in the category of one who
"renders any service in connection with the placement of an individual for adoption . . .. "72 The court stated that it "may not be the
warmest possible prose, but it literally does include the natural
parents. "73 The court also rejected appellants' argument that Article
27, section 35C, was enacted because section 5-327 does not address
compensation made to the natural parent. 74
The court next rejected appell.ants' contention that the word
"compensation" in section 5-327 means profit accruing to the natural
mother, not reimbursement for legitimate expenses. 75 Finally, in
67. [d. at 51-52, 591 A.2d at 474 (citation omitted) ("[lJt is clear in the case before
us that core concepts of due process would be violated by the entry of an
order directing repayment by the natural mother when she had been given no
notice that such an order might be entered and no opportunity to contest it. ").
68. [d. at 52, 591 A.2d at 474.
69. See id. at 52, 591 A.2d at 474 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
70. See id. at 42-43, 591 A.2d at 470. Appellants' arguments can be itemized as
follows: 1) the statute does not apply to payments made to the natural parent;
2) the statute only governs payments made which result in profit to the recipient
and not mere expense reimbursement; and 3) payment for maternity clothing
qualifies as a payment for reasonable and customary charges for medical
expenses as permitted by section 5-327(a)(2). [d.
71. [d. at 43-44, 591 A.2d at 470-71.
72. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-327(a)(1) (1991).
73. No. 9979, 323 Md. at 44, 591 A.2d at 471. The court based this assessment
in part on a report concerning independent adoptions, from a committee of
Maryland judges, that contained no suggestion that payments made to the
natural parents would be exempted. [d. at 45, 591 A.2d at 471 (discussing
REpORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE TO STUDY UNIFORM PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING
INDEPENDENT ADOPTIONS, COMMITTEE ON JUVENILE AND FAMILY LAW OF THE
MARYLAND JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, 57-66 (Nov. 1, 1988».
74. No. 9979, 323 Md. at 46-48, 591 A.2d at 472-73. Article 27, § 35C, was
enacted to provide penalties for those engaging in bahy selling. Thus, the court
found it inconceivable that the legislature would exclude payments made to
natural parents from the only statute dealing with prohibited payments. [d.
See generally infra note 93.
75. No. 9979, 323 Md. at 48-49, 591 A.2d at 473. The court relied on the customary
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rejecting appellants' contention that "reimbursement for maternity
clothing falls within the statutory exemption for payment of 'reasonable and customary charges or fees for hospital or medical or legal
services, "'76 the court determined that "[ f] actually, and logically,"
payments for maternity clothing are not medical expenses. 77 The
court finally held that "[s]ection 5-327 provides a general prohibition
against all payments, followed by a narrow exception for 'reasonable
and customary charges or fees for hospital or medical or legal
services'" that does not encompass reimbursement for maternity
clothing. 78
The language of section 5-327 seems clear in its prohibition of
certain types of payments and compensation to the natural mother.
If so, it is the duty of the court to give the clear and unambiguous
language of such a statute its natural connotation. 79 Judge Eldridge's
concurrence, however, raises some interesting questions, not only as
to the clarity of the legislature's intent, but also as to whether the
trial court had continuing jurisdiction after the entry of the adoption
decree. 8o
As held in Spencer, once the trial court has determined that it
is in the best interests of the child to grant an adoption decree, its
responsibility ends. 81 Here, the trial judge entered the final adoption
decree on October 25, 1989; thus, the trial court's jurisdiction ended
on that date. The trial court's order requiring the natural mother to
repay the $488.00, however, issued on December 14, 1989, nearly
two months later, and at a time when it had no authority to take
such action. 82 The majority opinion does not address this discrepancy
directly but does state that when the trial judge approved the adoption
he expressed concern about the $488.00 and requested legal memoranda on the issue. 83 Although the trial judge initially addressed the

76.
77.
78.

79.

80.

81.
82.
83.

usage and various definitions of the word "compensation," which led to the
conclusion that the word is broad enough to include, but not limited to, profit
alone.Id.
Id. at 49, 591 A.2d at 473 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-327(a)(2)
(1991».
Id.
Id. at 50, 591 A.2d at 473.
Stambaugh v. Child Support Enforcement Admin., 323 Md. 106, 1l0, 591
A.2d 501, 503 (1991) (citing Trimble v. State, 321 Md. 248, 582 A.2d 794
(1990».
See No. 9979, 323 Md. at 52, 591 A.2d at 474 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
Judge Eldridge agreed that the circuit court's December 14, 1989 order must
be vacated because the natural mother was not present at any of the proceedings
and was given no notice of that order. Judge Eldridge disagreed, however,
with the majority's interpretation of section 5-327. Id.
Spencer v. Franks, 173 Md. 73, 83, 195 A. 306, 310; see supra note 36.
No. 9979, 323 Md. at 54-55, 591 A.2d at 476 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
Id. at 41, 591 A.2d at 469.
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$488.00 before the final adoption decree was entered, he still approved the adoption. 84 One could infer from the entry of the final.
order that the judge considered it in the best interests of the child
to grant the adoption despite the possible violation of section 5-327.
If that is the case, either the trial judge's jurisdiction ended with the
entry of the final decree or he should not have signed the order until
this issue was resolved. 8s
The concurrence also disagrees with the majority position that
section 5-327 was intended to govern reimbursement payments made
by the adopting parents to the natural parents. 86 The concurrence
asserts that section 5-327(a)(1) was intended to prohibit third-party
intermediaries from attaining a profit from arranging adoptions: 87
"It stretches the bounds of credulity to interpret the phrase 'individual who renders any service in connection with the placement of an
individual for adoption ... ' as including the natural mother who
often, due to economic circumstances, may be forced to place her
child with another family. "88 Although the majority opinion acknowledges that such an interpretation does not constitute the "warmest
possible prose," it concludes that the text does literally fit the facts
of the case. 89 In fact, the majority could not conceive of anyone
rendering a greater service to the adoption process than the natural
mother of the child. 90 Even though the language of section 5-327
does not specifically include third parties or natural parents, but only
"individuals," among those who may not receive compensation for
the placement of a child, one may reasonably interpret the section
to include payments made to the natural parents.
What is more troublesome, however, is that section 5-327 governs
one who renders such a service and charges or receives payments
"from or on behalf of" the natural or adoptive parents. 91 This
language is a clear indication that section 5-327 is intended to govern
third-party actions during the adoption process.
Maryland Senate Bill 58, later enacted as Article 27, section
35C, also supports this argument. 92 Article 27, section 35C, enacted
to prohibit the sale of children by the natural parents, was originally
intended as a revision to section 5-327. 93 This underscores the opinion

84. [d.

85. See Spencer, 173 Md. at 83, 195 A. at 310.
86. No. 9979, 323 Md. at 60, 591 A.2d at 478 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
87. [d. at 61, 591 A.2d at 479 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
88. [d.
89. No. 9979, 323 Md. at 44, 591 A.2d at 471.
90. [d.
91. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-327(a)(1) (1991).
92. See S.B. No. 58, 1989 Md. Leg. Sess.
93. No. 9979, 323 Md. at 62-63, 591 A.2d at 479-80; see infra note 74. Article
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that section 5-327 was meant to govern third parties only; if it
governed payments made to the natural parents then section 35C
would appear superfluous.94
Finally, the majority opinion relies in part upon the Report of
the Subcommittee to Study Uniform Procedures for Handling Independent AdoptionSlS as a part of its interpretation of section 5-327. 96
According to the majority opinion, the report strongly favors application of the section's prohibitions to the natural and adoptive
parents. 97 Yet, section 5-327 was originally enacted in 1947 and the
report was compiled in 1988 as an opinion of four trial judges
concerning the application of the statute. 98 The report is not a part
of the actual legislative history of section 5-327 such that it would
indicate the prospective intent of the General Assembly.99 It does,
however, represent an interpretation of the section by the Maryland
courts. tOO
Judge Eldridge's concurrence culminates in the following assessment of the case:
In light of the language and legislative history of § 5-327,
this statute, containing only a criminal sanction, should not
be construed to encompass a small reimbursement for maternity clothing from the adopting parents to the natural
mother on the theory that the natural mother "render[ed]
[a] service in connection with the placement of an individual
for adoption." tOt
In light of both the legislative history of section 5-327 and the
enactment of Article 27, section 35C, as well, it seems that section
5-327 was not originally intended to govern the natural parent(s).
27, § 35C, of the Maryland Annotated Code provides as follows:
Child sale, barter, or trade prohibited.
(a) In general. - A person may not sell, barter, or trade, or
offer to sell, barter, or trade a child for money or property, either
real or personal, or anything else of value.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35C (Supp. 1992).
94. No. 9979, 323 Md. at 63, 591 A.2d at 480 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
95. See No. 9979, 323 Md. at 63-64 n.6, 591 A.2d at 480 n.6 (Eldridge, J.,
concurring) (discussing the majority's misplaced reliance on the REpORT OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEE TO STUDY UNIFORM PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING INDEPENDENT
ADOPTIONS, COMMITTEE ON JUVENILE AND FAMILY LAW OF THE MARYLAND
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE (Nov. 1, 1988».
96. See No. 9979, 323 Md. at 45, 591 A.2d·at 471.

97.Id.
98. Id. at 63-64 n.6, 591 A.2d at 480 n.6 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
99.Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 64-65, 591 A.2d at 481 (Eldridge, J., concurring) (alteration in No.
9979).
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One of the greatest obstacles to the protection of adopted
childrens' rights in this country is the growing black market for
babies. As noted in a recent Time Magazine article, "[a]doptive
parents won't blink an eyelash over paying $20,000 to $30,000 for a
healthy white baby." 102 The same article went on to say that the
escalating price tag of this "business" often creates a license to
steal. 103 It is against this backdrop that In re Adoption No. 9979 was
decided. The court stated unequivocally that the prohibition of section
5-327 is general in nature, and that the exception for medical expenses
is a narrow one. I04 Widening that exception to include compensation
for maternity clothing expenses will indirectly add an additional
source of income to an already booming and sometimes illegal
business. The court's decision will thus prevent this exception from
becoming a loophole for the expansion of that business.
Yet, the commentary noted above also asserts that, in many
states, a pregnant teen quickly realizes that with a child she becomes
eligible for Medicaid, food stamps and other welfare monies totalling
as much as $8,000 yearly.lOs Giving the child up for adoption often
results in "nothing but the pain of loss and the ridicule of her
peers. "106 To interpret section 5-327 so narrowly as to prevent the
payment of a legitimate expense that indirectly benefits the child may
further the epidemic of teen-age mothers necessarily on welfare.
Likewise, allowing adoptive parents to assist pregnant women with
their expenses during pregnancy affords these women options to care
for themselves and their unborn children.
The court's holding in No. 9979-that section 5-327 pertains to
reimbursement for maternity clothing expenses-represents one more
obstacle in an already long and complicated process. In order to
countermand this result, one recommendation is for the Maryland
General Assembly to explicitly permit reimbursement for reasonable
maternity clothing expenses and other reasonable expenses that indirectly benefit the health and well-being of the unborn child. To do
so might alleviate some of the burden on our welfare and public
assistance system by further promoting valid adoptions that are in
the child's best interests.
In In re Adoption No. 9979, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
has answered an important question regarding whether expenses
incurred by a natural mother during pregnancy are reimbursable by
adoptive parents. The court held that reimbursement by adoptive

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Gibbs, supra note 4, at 88.
[d.
No. 9979, 323 Md. at SO, 591 A.2d at 473.
Gibbs, supra note 4, at 86.
[d. at 86-87.
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parents for maternity clothing expenses is prohibited by section 5327 of the Maryland Family Law Code. I07 Under its interpretation
of section 5-327, the court considered the natural mother "an individual who renders [a] service in connection with the placement of
an individual for adoption." As such, the natural mother is generally
prohibited from accepting compensation by section 5-327(a)(l) of the
Maryland Family Law Code.lOs The court further held that such
expenses are not encompassed by the language of section 5-327(a)(2),
which provides an exception for "reasonable and customary charges
or fees for hospital or medical or legal services. "109
Although the result reached in this case is arguably correct, one
wonders whether it is truly consistent with the legislative intent
underlying Maryland's adoption law (i.e., the preservation and protection of the best interests of the adopted child). Permitting reimbursement to a natural mother for legitimate maternity clothing
expenses, which arguably provides an indirect benefit to the health
and well-being of an unborn child, seems more consistent with the
policy objective of Maryland's adoption statutes. The Maryland
General Assembly might wish to reconsider the scope of section 5327's coverage in light of the court's decision in this case and the
policy objectives of our adoption laws.
Donald A. Rea

107. No. 9979, 323 Md. at 40, 591 A.2d at 469.
108. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-327(a)(I) (1991).
109. No. 9979, 323 Md. at 50, 591 A.2d at 473.

